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Testing the Expectations Model
of the Term Structure: Some
Conjectures on the Effects of
Institutional Changes
HE TRADITIONAL expectatirmns model of time
ten’m structure of interest n-ates attempts to explain
hox\’intenest i-ates din a similar’ debt instrument
are related across difièn’ent nnatui-ities. tt posits
that, in a wom’ldwithout risk on’ one in which assets
an’e pen’fect sintistitutes, time one—peririd inten’est
n’ate should ed1ualthe exper:ted r’etun’n to holding
an instn-urnent cif longer matur’ity for’ rine pen’iodl.
Bec:ause the niciclel is based on the most funda-
mental economic assumptions — r’ational behax’—
ion’ by individuals who act on all ax’aitahle infoi-ma—
timi — it has held consider-able appeal in applied
n’esear-ch. Empin’icat tests for’ data across a range cif
countn’ies and sample periods, hciweven’, have
tendledi to i-eject this simple statement of the ex-
pectations mcidel.’ Mcin’eox’en’, expanding the basic:
model by adding other’ explanatonw x’an’iahles, such
as atime-varying nisk pi-emium or latent infonma-
tion variables, still has found limited ennpin’ical
success in explaining intenest n’ate behavior? Thus,
a puzzle n’emains: why is such abasic theon’etir:al
model so frequently n-ejer:ted by the data?
In this anticle, using short maturities in the
Eurocurrencx’ man’ket, we isolate several institu-
tional factor’s that might explain some nejectiomms
of the expectations model. Alternatively, the analy-
sis may lie viewed as an attempt to suggest spe-
cific characten-istics of policy procedun-es that are
inconsistent with the thecin’etical nncidei’s assunnp—
tious. Our n’esults suggest that single-countrx’ esti-
mates of the expectations model niay omit impor-
tant mnfon-mation because financial markets an’e
highly integn’ated across countries. Moreover’, it
appears as ifthe manner’ in which monetary pol-
icy is coniducted has effects on interest i-aresthat
contribute to rejections ofthe theory. In pan’ticu-
lam’, the expectations model does not hold in coun-
tries where the central bank — at least penodi-
cally — follows an exchange rate rifle. Acr:ounting
for relationships aci-oss markets and for’ the man-
ncr in which nnonetany policy is conducted n-c—
verses, in some cases, the negative couchirsion of
simple. single equation estimates of ten-m strt,ncture
m-elationships -
‘For a survey ofthese results, see Bisignano (1987).
‘Examples of work along these lines areShiller, et al. (1983)
and Campbell and Clarida (1987).38
THE EXPECTATIONS MODEL
APPLIED TO SHORT MATURITIES
The emnpin-ic:al version cif the expectations modlel
c:ani lie written as:
Ill lr’,, — I’,) = a + hlF,, — n’) + e,
wher-e r, is the vic’ld ciii a cine—per-lod bill in period
andl ,F’,~, is the current, ohsei~’edforward rate cm
a one-per’iod bill, one period kilo the future? Cod—
ficients to lie estimated ale denoted a and b; e, is
an en-ncir ten-mu with zero mean and van-iamlceedlual
to cr’. ‘l’hus, in equation 1, the dependent variable
is the dliffen’enice between actual vieldls on cine—
per-icid bills in consecutix’e periodls and time explan-
atory x’ar-iatilcn is the difler-euce betvx’een the cur’—
rent fon’wardi and spot rates oni one-per’iodl hills.
Equation I p1-edicts that the chanige mm cinme—
pen’icid yields should lie related to the for-ecasted
change. as n’epr-eseuted by the fcirwan’d n’ate — spot
n-ate spread. ‘l’he expectalious hypothesis implies
that, ifthe for-wan-cl n-ate is an unthiased predictor’ of
the futur’e spot n’ate, the n-egn’ession‘s slope ccief—
ficient, h, should not he significantly different from
oue and its intercept, a, should not he significantly
ci iffer’enmt fn’om zen’o.
This pcmteutiallv r-ich area forennpin-ical research
has yielded fex•x’ dlefiuitix’e r’esults because tests cif
the expectations model inexitalily have been joint
tests of sex’er-al maintaiuedl hypotheses. To cite
just a fe~x’of the problems that arise, the model
assumes a zen’o or’ ccmnmstanmt n-isk premium. The
pr-oblemn fon’ estiuiationi, howeven’, is that the risk
trw, ten-mi pn’emiinm — sonic systematic cliffen’ence
between the lcing—ter-ni interest n-ate amid the cx-
pectedl futur’e values of short—ten-ni inter-est n’ates
that n’eflects n’elatix’e degrees dif uncen’taiutv — is
uncibser-x’ahle. Thus, if an empirical test r’ejects time
hypothesis a = 0 and h= 1, it is ncit liossilile to
discriminate hetweemi tr’ue model rejection and
the pcissilile effects of atenu premium that has
lieen assumed, incorr’ec:tly, to lie zero. In pan’t fdir
this r-eason, as will be the case below, many stud—
ies have chosen to test aweaker form of the expec-
tations model (Ii = ii arid interpret the statistical
significanc:e cif the regr-ession’s initet-cept as indica—
tirig time existence of a ten-ni lmr-eniuum.’
‘l’lmer’e an’e dither testing pn’ohlems as well. When
dlata for’ longel’ maturities are studied, interest n’ate
diata often are estimated fronu a fitted yield cinrve
rather than taken fn’om obsen’vedl market transac-
tidinms. In this instance, nmegative results might be a
rejection difthe formula used to approximate un—
otiservalile interest rates rather’ than the expecta—
tidmns modhel. F’imially, the rationahty of expectations
by mar’kcrt agents is assunmed but, agaimi, this is
difficult ~ir’impossible to test dhr-ectlv. Although
mon’e attention has been paid in recent research to
mnodels that isolate these assumptions, it n’emaius
impossible to say whether negative results indi-
cate a r-ejection of the expectations model itself or




Asudited in the iutn’oduction, ecluations similar
to ill have been estimated with data for many
countries and sauiple periods. We illustrate these
results by estimating equaticmn I witim Har’n’is Bank
data cm spcmt thr’ee—ruonth deposit rates fr-dmni the
Eurocur’rency niiarket for’ the US., UK., West Gen’-
many, Jalian arid Sxvitzer-l~uid;six—nidmuth deposit
rates also were used, as explained in footnote 3, to
calculate values for tIme fcin’wan’d rate. The interest
rates are calculated as simple rates. The data are
Friday closing quoles for the Friday closest to time
Imeginniug of each mouth? ‘i’he sample period
spans February 1981 thn’ough October’ 1986. Al-
thciugh data prior’ to 1981 are ax’aiiatmle, the
Euroyen nimanket was thinly tr-aded and, in 1980,
the Carter Adiministratiomi adopted its Special
Credit Conitn-ol pr-cmgn-am. Because these factor-s
‘For one derivation of this result, see Mankiw and Miron (1986),
p.214. Strictly speaking, this specification holds up to acon-
stant (the term premium), whichwe have ignored. Theas-
sumption wasthat, for the short maturities used in this paper,
term premium effects, if any, should be negligible. Also see
Bisignano (1987). Cosset (1982) found thatforward rates in
this marketare unbiased, but not optimal, predictorsof future
interest rates. He also found this marketto be efficient in the
sense thatpast informationon interest ratesis not useful in
predicting future values of interest rates.
Valuesfor the forward rate, ,F,,,,, were calculated as twice
the two-period interest rateminus the one-period rate. Because
the datain the study use three-month ratesto represent the
theoretical“one period,” the forward rate is calculated as twice
the six-month (two period) rate minus the corresponding three-
month rate.
‘See, forexample, Shiller, et al, (1983).
‘First-Friday-of-month data, rather than monthly averages of
daily orweeklydata, were used to avoid questions about how
to treat partial weeks in adjoining months, months with different
numbersof weeks andthe gap between three, four-week
monthsand athirteen week quarter.See Hakkioand Leider-
man (1984) fora discussion of these measurement issues.39
Table 1
Estimates of the Basic Expectations
Theory Relationship (monthly data,
1981.02—1986.10)
country ab A?
United States 032 0? 6 00~
ng2n 268:
United Kingdom 0 00 U90 U 0:3
1000: c-3m
Gor--’ianv 046 362 008
‘3 PSi V’
~apa1 0-? 0 92 02~
721 027i
Swnzerlind 023 00-a 000
iLl 821 2 9?l
NOTE AOso ute va’uc-s uft-stanct-:.5 a aim- p~re-’rheses
-siut al cs kr b aio y t’ tie r jR nvpc~becit,h 1 An aster S.~
ml cat-s a upe:,-oe’tc eni s:ariifrarn ly ‘f~rer-t ‘r Ti Oct At
nI-c 005 ‘evil 0’ smiic’nce
could adx rrsmth ilirri liii Ii~tre~niits, diii nm nil tci
Febn—uany I IS I ii - not i i,~ri I mu i-~l imnutim ‘m -
Finally, a comment cm flu nil al ‘11)1 1mm iach to
estimation is necessirx 1k-i .ruse lu lata consist
of observations (in thmm-r immomiih x rIds ~ampled
monthly, the changes in immu-m-i-st mmli-smm\ erlap and
intn’oduce a second order moving a~ mm age pnocess
into the data, Because this prcmper’tyof the data
will affect the estimated coefficients standard
em’ror’s, it must lie consider-ed by time estimation
technique. The Hanseu-Hodn-ick pr’ocedur-e we use
accounts for- this pn’opert~by ccmrrectingthe
ruodel’s ern’orterm for serial cor’n’elation?
BASIC RESULTS
The n’esults fl-on) estiniatinig equation 1 an-c n-c-
pom’tedl in table 1, ‘l’he expectations mcidel is
clean-ly r’ejectedlfor the Uuited States, Germany
and Switzerland; their estimated slope coefficients
an’e significantly difl’en’ent fi’cmm mine. In conitr’ast,
the results for’ time United Kingdom and Japan
support the expectations model, Explanatony
power’ fon’the edluations is generally low with time
notable exception of Japan)? This n-esult is typical
in estimates of the expectations mcidel, indicating
that inten’est rate time sen-ies closely approximate a
random walk. Overall, these mixed n’esulls repre-
sent the typical findinigs of pn-ex’immus ernpii’ical
wmmr-k on the expectations nuodel.
The ruixed n-esults in)table 1 can lime interpreted
in two ways. Due initerpr’etatiou is that time expec-
tations model is rejected Imecause it appears not to
hold fcmr mcmst of the countries exanunedl, Another
interpretation is that instituticmual or other consid-
erations, which the pure theory n-egar-ds either as
given or uuimnpon-tant, may have had adverse ef-
fects on the empirical tests. Anmong oflien’s, impon-—
taut stn-uctun-al changes that will affect the n-esults
include time condfuct of U.S. mmmnetan-x’ policy,
changes in iuter-est n-ate ceilings anid general finan-
cial market deregulation. Given the results shown
in table 1, pr’evioins n’esean-ch genen-allvhas left
these results unexplained orhas addled some ad
hoc measun’e of risk to account fon’ time pmmssihle
effects of an unobservable ten-ri) pn-emiunm. In time
sections that fcmllow, we first revise time estimation
pr’cmceclur’e to see how this change affects the test
n’esults, We therm discuss some well-defined ex’ents
and changes in instituticmus that ccmuldl affect time
term structun-e relations and pn’oduce time results
that appear- to m’eject the model.




The irmcn-easiugintegration of wdmr’id capital mat’—
kets suggests that an alternative statistical ap-
pn’oach shciulml lie used to estimate equation I . As
capital flows freely among nations, nndmuetarv pol-
icyactions (for- example) under-taken in one cciunm—
try can lie expected to affect financial varialiles in
other counmtn-ies as well, Consider’, for- example, a
change in Bundeslmank policy that affects Ger’man
inter-est m’ates andi then is tr-ausmitted to iuten-est
rates in time other fcmum’ nations via calmital flows
causedl by the change in German inten-est rates,
This effect, which will appean’ only in the en’n’or
ten-ni of time Germuan interest n-ate equation xvhenm
sepan’ate regressions an-c estimated, could be cx-
imloited as a new sour-ce of information for each
r’egn’ession if time country equations wel’e estimated
‘In fact, the U.S. results are extraordinarily sensitive to these
fewdata points. The dramatic increase in interest rate volatility
duringthe first and second quarters of 1980, relative to the
remaining sample,would suggest this sensitivity in OLS re-
gression estimates.
‘For an extensive description ofthe econometrics used to
account forthe effects ofthe third-order serial correlation, see
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Campbell and Clarida (1987).
‘Durbin-Walson statistics are not reported because, as indi-
cated in the text, thereported standard errors reflect correc-
tionsfor serial correlation in the data.40
Table 2
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NOTE AbsolLine va-,jr,s et t’ctatisi cs ,jr5 in 0a-em,tnpse,
Fo- h the i-statistic anp- en, ‘o tner~hynntnc.s:s A-i
aste’sk rncicatpsi slope n oeff,r cit sign t-cantiy caterer
tom one at the 0,05 level c’ s:gn-ficance
F-tcs ‘0’ nt. hypothesis b a - b - bh —
- is 5 63 cu”nparet. ~-it n a ~r,ticalv-alec of 2 21
jointly, In other’ words, time error’ term of asingle
equation which n’eflects “news.” on’ unpn’edictable
events within that countn-yl also nua conmtair inmfon’—
mation — due to linkages aruonmg uman-kets — that
is relevant to explainming inter’est n’ate imeimavior in
another country. ‘lime inmportanmt pcmint is that the
expectations modeh lmeinmg tested assumes that this
infor-matiou is heing used by the national agents
whose collective acticmus deten-minme changes in
inten’est rates- Single equation estinmates, however’,
exclude time infonnationm implicit in these linkages
because they look at data foreach country mi iso-
latimmn -
One way to account for this ruissinmg infon’rtmation
is to estimate equation 1, as applied to the five
countr’ies under study, as asystem of seemingly
unrelated regressions SUB).’ This procedure con-
sider’s contemporaneous conn’eiations that might
exist among time en-mr tenms rmf the fiveequations
and, by doing so, impr’oves the efficiency with
which the coefficients an’e estimated.
The SlUR Results
The results fr-or)) estimating the five equationms
by SUR are repon’ted in table 2, ‘that inupoi’tarmt
information exists in the enrol’ tenors is snmhstanti—
ated by time comu1muted value of 56.34 for- a Iikel
Imood ratio statistic testing whether rovan-ianices
among the em’t’ol tei’mins are zem-o; this value is to he
compared with the 5 percent ci-itirai value of
18.30. ‘the er’oi’ coval’ianre amid correlation
matr-ices t-epcmi-ted it) talmie 3 indicate where the
sigmuticant coi’m-clations between count ties were
fuund. Note, in pan-ticulam’, the high com-t’elations
hetwee I) the If.S. an ci Get-many andl between
Get-many and Swit/erlandi. Con~ectumusto explain
these cone lations am)d, )ossitmiv, nuodel rejections
ate dinsctissed later it) m-efet’enee to the tatile 4
n’esults.
Al thougim OLS and Stfi’t shotrlcl pn’ocluce sim-
ilar coefficient estinmiates, both the U.S. and S~•viss
slope coefficients repon-ted in table 2 arm: mam’kedlv
differ-cut fr’mmnmm their values in table I - In view of time
low values for if in liotli the t .S. and Swiss equa-
tions, hcmwevei-, these cimauges uier’elv indicate
that, for-these data, the basic specification of the
expectations model simply dcmes not produce jire—
cisc estinmates of the slope coefficient. ‘l’he rmiore
inuportant tmcminmt is timat, after using time SUB estinmma—
ton-, time hypolimesis that all five slope coefficients
are jointly equal to one still is rejected. Finally, the
Japanese initet-cept, which did not change uunmmen’i—
cally, rmow is significarmth’ different fr-oru zc:r’o. Be-
cause time Gen’umarm and tJ ,K. n’esuits are iam’gelynit)-
affectedl by time SUB estinuationm, however, this
simple change mm estinuatior) pn’ocedlur’e to incon-—
1mor’ate linkages among financial umar-kets, while
indicating timat sigrmificanmt inmfon’matiorm exists in time
correlations anuotmg enrol’ terms across equatnorms,
still n-ejectsthe expectaticinms modfel for most of the
counmtr’ic-~sexamniuedf.
(fl’IIER SOURCES OF EXPLOITABLE
INFORMAIJON
Ancither assunmptimmn behind enmpin’icaltests cif
the expectations nmmodel is tlmat time data used for’
estinnationm wet-c genmer-ated dlurinmg a pen’iod char-
acter-ized lmy a statmie econmcmmic stn-ucture. Mon-c-
oven’, the data should he drawn fr’onm nmankets in
which inter’est rates can adjust freely. ‘t’lmus, the
basic model should not be estinmiated witim data
from pen’iods associated with umajor policy
‘Edwards (1982) has made thesame pointand reported much-
improved results for a similar model applied to the exchange
rate. Krol (1987) also reported substantial integration of these
markets acrosscountries. Mankiw (1986), however, finds little
correlation across countries and speculates that capitalcon-
trols may “prevent effective international arbitrage (p. 66)”.
SeeZellnem (1962) for details on the estimation procedure.41
Table 3
Error Correlation and Covariance Matrices From The SUR
Estimation
United United
Country States Kingdom Germany Japan Switzerland
~ovariance Across Models
Umi’tec S--ntes 2 ~9
Urtc’cK,’icdom 043 20’,
344 025 043
Japar- 006 007 0’l 023
Swnz~ra-ic C ‘~ 049 030 OCfl ‘37
correlation Matrix
tin tc’; States 1 00
Un- tec K noniom 0 ic’ 00
L,n”ra,’iy 0 43’ 0 27’ 1 ‘JO
Japan ona t.~c 033’ 00
Swi:,er,yic 008 029’ 038’ 001 ~00
5 pcrccrl s-qr’i’,,‘?‘lZel~-vc’itorcorre anon 0 25
F-cr tnc ru h’yontbesis than the c-ft-dnacc.na’ e’etn”n:s 0’ tt—e c,c-,atia-ice ‘nal’ix ime zeu nbc-
lrkolii’-noc ra’i’- stanisit. is 56’3 I vs a ‘ pcrcer~ cntical~-alun otiS 30
Table 4
Revised Expectations Model SUR Estimates
country a b MTARGET EMS
U’i’teoS’ateb 056 045
1223 V08- 0881 --
Un- ted K-ngrtom 00 3 0 94
nO 02~ W19,’ - -
Or-’n~any 047 0~7 —-- 056
-5561 :383:’ --- 0 72~
Japan 0 ‘S 1 07
13.0/ no 42 - -
Swi:zertanc 0 40 0 h8 -- 0 62
t242~ V 60- -— 11 27r
NOTE Aoso!Jte vaj~sofn-stat’s!ics a’e in parentheses Fr-m h, t-statis:c aap os to -he n-u!!
hyoo:hcsis b 1 An astn,r-~-c-nc-ca:es a s1ope uoef’icen’ sicr-’ticantlycittercr’t t’orr om c at the C) 05
levc- ot s’qn ttance
F-test fet ru!l -iypothcsis b, b - h -- h,, 1 s3,5 versus ac rt,r,at value ot 221
i’h,timui’~or’ immipm’dimm—iils In mu;nnkc-t _idtu~trtments r’nnn’m’c’d nln:m’inn~the pm’m’irmd u~m—dtm~nrst;mual mm md
tim’ t’,i—,t’ tnt tIme tummtmi’t’, ilt,itrit’ rOlU’\ r’il,mtl4e~ a,~—,i’, ‘, lluit\ Iile\ ,mttei t liii’ u’—,mtIt~u—pui’lt’c! ,mhrm~r
ttt,i\ t’,itt’,t’ lit’!21’ tli—,t’tt-tt’ ‘Ii itm~~i——, itt t’\llt’m’lttittil~
nil’ t’ll.mtlri—s ill 11mm’ \,ii i,tIiiiit~ ii c’\
1
1e(’t,tlicitls lIi~it
hi’ rn’,rsnnir’ni ui mmrmrnic’llc’tl iJmr)pr’m’I,\ suit’
l;mmi~,t,nI~imnr,ci,tt,t tutu ,‘,~t\ 1 jti’t’itt(l t’ii,tt,it’ti’ti,i-tl simlr m’ ()n’tmnin’m Ht~’!ttin- I i’dm-i,tl Itrser’\r hi—,
I\ ititi’ti’’,l t’att- n’itttltcils \‘uimlnl ti- itrtj)l)t(ilti’i_tti’ ttsi’tl t~~mn nli-’Inmmc’t cmlnn’i_ttumlmi_tI jim-tmn-iqlttte, ml] it—,
itt tc’’~tiin4tIin’nimrrmlc’l imr-,min~m’Iint’nii\ ,u—,—,ttmmmc-s Ili,nt m’mmtrdmn I it tti(titt’t,mt\ j)i)li(\ llm-t~~m-m-mr ()r’tmilmi’i’
immtm’mr’—rl tilt’’, r’,tti ,itljnu—t tt’i’n’l~ iii lmn’itc’—ti\ t’tt!ri t!t;:m 1mm
1
()n’IntIii’i I!1M2 urn— In—cl c’-,t,uiili’,lim—ci
ti—titi\t’ n’ttin’iu’tll tmmtm’I~m—t’, mm ~~In,nctiillt,~~s I,n’lnin 4t-tetl ji.icli tn’ !rilltiIntttt}~\I’tiii’Setmi—~’, liii’, •t~i
fl tlt——,c’t un’ ~,nmmlirmt,nrcmn’(’Ii_timr4n—~tIrit ii,i~n’nit — nmm,,nn—Ii
1
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Chart 1
Changes in Federal Funds Rate
tuate within wider- bands than had the previous
pn’ocedun’e,which had focused on keeping the
federal funds n’ate withinm anarrow nange. In Octo-
ber 1982, the Feden’al Reserve announced that, due
to increasing uncertainties about the definition of
the Ml aggregate, it would conduct monetan’v
policy by setting an) objective for’ hot-rowed ne-
serves;this latter strategy n’esulted in less van-iation
in shon’t—term inmterest m’ates.’°Thus, the first part of
the sanmple per-iod used mm the estimation is chat’-
acten’ized by a Fed oper’atinmg procedure that pen—
umitted gu’eateu’ variatiorm inn shon-t—term interest
n’ates; timis pei’iod is followed by foun’years cmf data
associated with a pr’ocedure that, cmnmce againm, re-
duced the variatimmnn in shor’t—tet’nmm inmtem’est n’ates,
The belmavior ofthe feden-al funds nate, which sup-
pon’ts tlmis depiction of events, is simownm in chart 1.
1-lowwould this switch in policy irnplenuenta-
tion affect tests cmf the expectations model? Ac-
ccmrdingto Mankiw and Mirou (1986), Fed policy
based on smocmtiming short-term intem’est rates can
he ciman’acterized as:
(2) E, (Ar,_ ,) = 0
or’. time expectedi change in the shon’t-rate at each
nuonuent in time is zero even if the Fed has been
otmsetved to change shon’t n’ates mm response to. say,
real GNP growth cmr inflation n’ates that deviated
from pm’ior expectations, Ifequation 2 desctibes
Fed policy since October’ 1982 (audI pricmr to Octo-
ber 1979), the value of (,F,,,, — r,,) in equation 1 will
always he zero anmd shon’t-term inten’est rates will
behave, appn’oximately, as a n’audomn walk. In this
case, the expectations modei of the ten-rn stt-uctun-e
would be incapable of exphaining the behavior of
shot-t-ter’m interest rates.
Maukiw and Mit-on (1986) inmvestigated this prob-
lem usinmg annual U.S. data froru 1890—1914 and
‘See Watich (1984)and Gilbert (1985) for more discussion
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1915—TO. They founmd that support for the expec-
tations nmodel van’ied vvitim nuonmet-arv regime. Wimile
time expectationms model ‘holds’ for the pn-e—Fed
pen’iod, when then’e was nmo nmonetany anntimoritv to
snuooth inten’est r’ates, the model is rejected fon’ time
later period wimenu time Fed’s approach to pcilicv
tended to smootim flucLuaticinus in shon’t-ten-nm inter-—
est i’ates. Their results, timer’efot’e, suggest that the
tJ.S, resinlts n-epon’ted mm table 2 — anmd pen’haps
other reject’nonms of time model usinmg post—1979 U.S.
data — could) be dominated by time sub—sample
associatedl with the post—October 1982 chanmge in
F’eden’al Reserve operating procedlures.
.Eilects oJ’Exchange Rate .trnterventiorm
Rules
‘t’ime fotnnding of tIme Eun-opean Mcmetat’v System
(EMS) is anmotlmen irnpon’tanmt chanmge timat occurred
in 1979 anmd is a possible soui’ce of the nmegative
results for Gen-nmmany andl Switzen-Iand. Tlme EMS
agteenmeut establislmed ranges fon’bilateral ex-
change m’ates of the nnenmben’countn’ies and called
for’ coopet-ative intenvenmtionms by the central banks
of the countries involved wimen) n-ates deviatedi fn’onm
their specified rammges. Thus, Ger’nuanm nuonnenam’v
policy sirmce 1979 has been conmstrained by its par—
ticipatior) in the exchanmge nate agn’eennenmt audi its
pledge to inten’vene.’’ hi practice, Germans’ has
become the leader of the EMS due to the size of its
econonmv and its low inmflationm n-ate; dither EMS
countn’ies have followed its nonminmfiatiormarv nnone—
tarv policy. Muclm r’esean-ch Imas simown timat time
EMS agreenuent really has hehavedi as ifa dollanY
[3M objective were pun’sued by tine Gen’nuan centn’ai
bank.
trm addition, Swiss nnonetany policy is influenmced
by time nM/Swiss franmc exchange i-ate even though
Switzerlanmd is not anm EMS nmmember.” Because
standlard models typically explain time beimavior of
time exchange r’ate as depending cirm time spn-ead
between foreigrm anmd domestic iutei’est n’ates, at-
tempts by the Buniclesbank to infiuenmce time dollar-I
DM excimange m’ate also would create a strong link
imet’ween) Gen’nmman and Swiss inten’est n-ates.’4 Sup-
pose, for example, that time dollar were depn’eciat-
ing againush the DM because U.S. interest rates were
fallinmg.The Bunmdesbank could atterupn to stop or
reverse timis dollar dlepn’eciation by expanmding time
German nmonmey stock and loweu’ing Gem-man simon’t—
ten-mu interest n’aLes. Suc:h an action, imoweven’,
wouldi cause timevalue of time Swiss fu-ancto rise
against tIme DM. tr) time past, the Swiss National
Bank has responded to this or similar) sequenmce
of evenuts b folloivirmg time Bunmdeshank with a
muone expansionary monetary policy and lower
simort—ten’nmm irmten’est rates as it attempted to n’e—
establish some desired value for time DM/Swiss
fr-anc exchange rate, This close linmkage of Gei-nuani
and Swiss intetest rates, fronm a Swiss objective for
stability of time bilater’al excimange n’ate, is likely to
he time soun-ce of tlme highly con’n’eiated Swiss anmd
Gei-ruan en’n’on’ter’nms n’epon’ted mm table 3~~5 mm sunm,
hotim Ger’muanm and Swiss monmetany policies are
influenced by exchange n-ate cormsiden’ations timat
could affect enupirical estinnates of time expecta-
tions nnodel.
Empirical Implementation
‘l’o itmt’estigate timese possibilities, time system of
SUB equations n’epon-ted mm table 2 was n-e—
estimated with changes in tIme US., Ger’nuanand
Si~4ssr’egn’essions. For time 11.5,, time whole-sample
slope coeff’ncienmt was split to represenmt the two
distinmct periodis of F’eden’al Reserve operatinmg pro—
cedlun-es. A slope durunmy (MTARGETI was intro-
duced, wimich took avalue of one between Febru-
an-v 1981 and Septenmber 1982 and avalue of zercu
for the remainminmg montims. Ifthe Mankiw-Min-on
hypotimesis is com’n’ect, the slope coefficient fon’ time
fin’st pan’t of the sanmple lb plus MTAHGETI slmould
not be significantly differ’ent fn’onu one while the
coethcienmt fon’time latten’period lb alone) should he
significantly diffen-ent (less Lhanm) fn’onm onme.’”
Although the precise way to quantihi time inmpact
of time EMS agr’eenmment on Ger’marm and Swiss fimmarm-
cial nmarkets is not clean’, time pen’iods when tIme
‘The history of theEMS and a discussion of how it functions can
be found in Ungerer, en al, (1986).
2See for example, Fels (1987) for adiscussionof the EMS as a
dollar/OM commitment by the Bundesbank.
‘Because trade represents 39 percent of Swiss GOP and trade
with Germany accounts forone-fifth of tonal trade, the Swiss
franc/GM exchange rate has been particularlyimportant to the
conduct of Swiss monetary policy. The Swiss National Bank, at
times, has abandoned its obiectivesfor the growth rate of the
monetary base and, instead, pursued an exchange rate obiec-
tive. See Rich and Beguelin (1985).
145ee, forexample, the model presented by Dornbusch (1980).
15A related point thatsuggests this sort of influence across
countries is based on resultsfrom Belongia and Ott (1988).
They show thatthe dollar exchange rate riskpremium and the
amount thatthe exchange rate adjusts to a given domestic-
foreign interestdifferential both vary with the choice of Federal
Reserve operating procedure (interest rate vs. money stock
objectives). If nothingelse, their resultwould besuggestive of a
time varying risk premium in the expectations model.
“An intercept dummy also was tried but it was not significant
individually and had no material effectson the magnitudesor
significance of other coefficients.44
member countries agreed to nmajdun nuahgmmnmemmts
of the official exchange n-ate levels and m’anmges are
known, Othen’things the same, one can hvpothe-
size that inten’est rates made dlisctete adjustnmmenmts
to these reahgnnnments within one nnonmth after the~’
were announced, To test the pm’oposition about
exchange n’ate linkages and immterest m’ates, a
dumnmy variablewas created to n’epm’esent EMS
realignments anmd was intm’odum:ed into hotim the
German and Swiss n’egn’essions. This variable tcuok
a value of one during the months associated witim
the eight EMS n’eahgnruermts and avalue of zen-o
during all othem-months,” As witim time US. case,
multiplying the forward n-ate — spot n-ate spr’ead in
the German and Swiss n’egr’essions by timis dumnmy
variable permits the estimation of two diffen’ent
values for the n’egressions’ slope coefficients: one
coefficient for ‘nornmal” periods arid the sum of
two coefficients formonths when a m’ealignment
occurred,
in table 4,the revised SUB results are reported.
The null hypothesis that all five slope coefficients
ane jointly equal to one is rejected, once again, at
the 0.05 level of significance, ‘rhe expectations
model is rejected even after augnmenting the infon’-
mation set to incorporate changes in the imple-
mentation of US, monetany policy and the EMS
realignments.
Looking at individual country results, the table’s
top row, associated with the slope dummy forthe
period of monetary targeting in the United States,
indicates that estimates of the expectations model
am’e sensitive to changes in the Fed’s openating
procedure. Even though the MTARGET dumnuy is
not significant, the model’s whole-pen’iod slope
coefficient inmcn-eases fn’om 0.20 to 0.45 and nciw is
not significantly different fn’om one.
i’his apparent impm’ovement in time US, mesults.
however, is in direct contrast to Mankiw anmd
Min’on’s results in two n’espects, First. wimen they
attempted to investigate the effects of post-1979
data on the expectations model, they teponted
that “we obtain standard em’rors so lam-ge that one
can reject no interesting l~pothesis’ (p. 227).
Mon’e impon’tant, they hypothesized that the ex-
pectations model should riot he rejected fon’the
period of immoney stock tam’geting, hut should he
rejected for the post-September 1982 period; em-
pirically, this implies that h plus MTARGET should
nmot be statistically nlifiei-unm t fiurmm 0 nme n’imiIc b alorme
should be significantly differ’emit fm-minim (less tlmanl
onme. in fact, time n’esults au’e u’eveu’sed; the expecta—
tionms model is n-ejected for time pet-nod of ummonmey
stock tar-getinmg. ‘l’lmus, while the clumnnmy variable
improves time overall m’esults and pr’ovides pem’lmaps
a stm’onger test of their’ model, time exact process at
work is incommsistenmt witim time one lmvpothesized,
leaving an urmexplainedi puzzle.
Time revised estimates for- time Gernmman anmd Swiss
equations pn’ovideweak suppom’t fon time conjectum’e
timat the intervenmtiormpolicies cif their- centn’albanks
imaye significanmt effects onm tests cuf the expectatiotms
nmmodel, Time signs on time slope dunmnmmies an-c nega-
tive anmd similar inn nmagnitude, to the i,vimoie pem’iod
slope coefticient, wimicim indicates timat the fcirwar’d
rate-spot n’ate spread has zen-n effect diun-itmg
nmonths of EMS m’eahgnnuents. Moreover’, time whole
per-tonI Swiss slope coefficient now botim is lam’ger
numem’icall and not sigtmificantly diffen’ent fronm
onme, Fot- Germany. however’, tine results are not
altem-ed when the dates of EMS m-ealignmenmts am-c
considered anmcl time data continue to n-eject the
expectations model.
CONCLUSIONS
The expectations model of time ternn str-ucture of
interest rates has been applied to data for a mmum-
her of countries and sample per’iods with genen’-
ally negative results, tim timis article we have investi-
gated sonne cormditiorms under whicim time
expectationms nmodei might lie n’ejected mm time conm-
text of its traditiormai single equation test. We
foundsubstantial connelations across the em’m’om’s of
the individual equations which, wImerm exploited by
using SUB estinnation, impr’oved time efficiency of
estimation. We also found that, altimougim dunmnmy
variables used to represent changes in the ap-
pn-oacim to monetary policy or EMS exchange rate
targets wet-c not significanmt individually, they corm-
tn’ibuted somuewhat to improved oven-all ciman-actet’-
istics of time edluations. Although, as in previous
studies, many puzzles still n’enmain, these results
suggest timat tests of the expectationms ruodel
should use nuote genem’al models and mon-cef-
ficient estimatiorm pn’ocedun’es than the sinuple OLS
equation typically employed.
“Thedates of EMS realignments were March 23 and October5,
1981; February 22 and June 14, 1982; March21, 1983; July
22, 1985; April 7and August 4, 1986 and are provided in Fels,
p.217.
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